Vanderbilt Law Review
Volume 3
Issue 3 Issue 3 - A Symposium on Statutory
Construction

Article 24

4-1950

Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or
Canons about how Statutes are to be Construed
Karl N. Llwellyn

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr
Part of the Courts Commons, and the Jurisprudence Commons

Recommended Citation
Karl N. Llwellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons about how
Statutes are to be Construed, 3 Vanderbilt Law Review 395 (1950)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol3/iss3/24

This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more
information, please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu.

REMARKS ON THE THEORY OF APPELLATE DECISION AND
THE RULES OR CANONS ABOUT HOW STATUTES
ARE TO BE CONSTRUED
KARL N. LLEWELLYN

*

One does not progress far into legal life without learning that there is
no single right and accurate way of reading one case, or of reading a bunch
of cases. For
(1) Impeccable and correct doctrine makes clear that a case "holds"
with authority only so much of what the opinion says as is absolutely necessary to sustain the judgment. Anything else is unnecessary and "distinguishable" and noncontrolling for the future. Indeed, if the judgment rests on two,
three or four rulings, any of them can be rightly and righteously knocked out,
for the future, as being thus "unnecessary." Moreover, any distinction on the
facts is rightly and righteously a reason for distinguishing and therefore disregarding the prior alleged holding. But
(2) Doctrine equally impeccable and correct makes clear that a case
"holds" with authority the rule on which the court there chose to rest the
judgment; more, that that rule covers, with full authority, cases which are
plainly distinguishable on their facts and their issue, whenever the reason for
the rule extends to cover them. Indeed, it is unnecessary for a rule or principle to have led to the decision in the prior case, or even to have been
phrased therein, in order to be seen as controlling in the new case: (a) "We
there said.. ." (b) "That case necessarily decided..."
These divergent and indeed conflicting correct ways of handling or
reading a single prior case as one "determines" what it authoritatively holds,
have their counterparts in regard to the authority of a series or body of
cases. Thus
(1) It is correct to see that "That rule is too well settled in this
jurisdiction to be disturbed"; and so to apply it to a wholly novel circumstance. But
(2) It is no less correct to see that "The rule has never been extended
to a case like the present"; and so to refuse to apply it: "We here limit the
rule." Again,
(3) It is no less correct to look over the prior "applications" of "the
rule" and rework them into a wholly new formulation of "the true rule" or
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"true principle" which knocks out some of the prior cases as simply ",nisapplications" and then builds up the others.
In the work of a single opinion-day I have observed 26 different, describable ways in which one of our best state courts handled its own prior
cases, repeatedly using three to six different ways within a single opinion.
What is important is that all 26 ways (plus a dozen others which happened not to be in use that day) are correct. They represent not "evasion,"
but sound use, application and development of precedent. They represent not
"departure from," but sound continuation of, our system of precedent as it has
come down to us. The major defect in that system is a mistaken idea which
many lawyers have about it-to wit, the idea that the cases themselves and
in themselves, plus the correct rules on how to handle cases, provide one
single correct answer to a disputed issue of law. In fact the available correct
answers are two, three, or ten. The question is: Which of the available correct answers will the court select-and why? For since there is always more
than one available correct answer, the court always has to select.
True, the selection is frequently almost automatic. The type of distinction or expansion which is always technically available may be psychologically or sociologically unavailable. This may be because of (a) the
current tradition of the court or because of (b) the current temper of the
court or because of (c) the sense of the situation as the court sees that sense.
(There are other possible reasons a-plenty, but these three are the most
frequent and commonly the most weighty.)
The current tradition of the court is a matter of period-style in the
craft.of judging. In 1820-1850 our courts felt in general a freedom and duty
to move in the manner typified in our thought by Mansfield and Marshall.
"Precedent" guided, but "principle" controlled; and nothing was good
"Principle" which did not look like wisdom-in-result for the welfare of All-ofus. In 1880-1910. on the other hand, our courts felt in general a prime duty to
order within the law and a duty to resist any "outside" influence. "Precedent"
was to control, not merely to guide; "Principle" was to be tested by whether
it made for order in the law, not by whether it made wisdom-in-result. "Legal"
Principle could not be subjectedto "political" tests; even legislation was resisted as disturbing. Since 1920 the earlier style (the "Grand Style") has been
working its way back into general use by our courts, though the language of the
opinions moves still dominantly (though waningly) in the style (the "Formal
Style") of the late 19th Century. In any particular court what needs study is
how far along the process has gotten. The best material for study is the latest
volume of reports, read in sequence from page 1 through to the end: the current mine-run of the work.
The current temper of the court is reflected in the same material, and
represents the court's tradition as modified by its personnel. For it is plain
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that the two earlier period-styles represent also two eternal types of human
being. There is the man who loves creativeness, who can without loss of
sleep combine risk-taking with responsibility, who sees and feels institutions
as things built and to be built to serve functions, and who sees the functions as
vital and law as a tool to be eternally reoriented to justice and to general
welfare. There is the other man who loves order, who finds risk uncomfortable
and has seen so much irresponsible or unwise innovation that responsibility
to him means caution, who sees and feels institutions as the tested, slow-built
ways which for all their faults are man's sole safeguard against relapse into
barbarism, and who regards reorientation of the law in our polity as essentially
committed to the legislature. Commonly a man of such temper has also a
craftsman's pride in clean craftsman's work, and commonly he does not view
with too much sympathy any ill-done legislative job of attempted reorientation.' Judges, like ther men, range up and down the scale between the extremes of either type of temper, and in this aspect (as in the aspect of
intellectual power and acumen or of personal force or persuasiveness) the
constellation of the personnel on a particular bench at a particular time plays
its important part in urging the court toward a more literal or a more creative
selection among the available accepted and correct "ways" of handling
precedent.
More vital, if possible, than either of the above is the sense of the
situation as seen by the court. Thus in the very heyday of the formal period
our courts moved into tremendous creative expansion of precedent in regard
to the labor injunction and the due process clause. What they saw as sense
to be achieved, and desperately needed, there broke through all trammels of the
current period-style. Whereas the most creative-minded court working in the
most creative period-style will happily and literally apply a formula without
discussion, and even with relief, if the formula makes sense and yields justice
in the situation and the case.
So strongly does the felt sense of the situation and the case affect the
court's choice of techniques for reading or interpreting and then applying the
authorities that one may fairly lay down certain generalizations:
A. In some six appealed cases out of ten the court feels this sense so
clearly that lining up the authorities comes close to being an automatic job.
In the very process of reading an authority a distinction leaps to the eye,
and that is "all" that that case holds; or the language of another authority
(whether or not "really" in point) shines forth as "clearly stating the true
rule." Trouble comes when the cases do not line up this clearly and semi1. Intellectually, this last attitude is at odds with the idea that reorientation is for
the legislature. Emotionally, it is not. Apart from the rather general resistance to change
which normally companions orderliness of mind, there is a legitimate feeling that within
a team team-play is called for, that it is passing the buck to thrust onto a court the labor
of making a legislative job make sense and become workable.
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automatically, when they therefore call for intellectual labor, even at times
for a conclusion that the law as given will not allow the sensible result to
'be reached. Or trouble comes when the sense of the *ituation is not clear.
B. Technical leeways correctly available when the sense of the situation
and the case call for their use cease to be correctly available unless used in
Jurtheranceof what the court sees as such sense. There is here in our system
,of precedent an element of uprightness, or conscience, of judicial respon-sibility; and motive becomes a factor in determining what techniques are
-correct and right. Today, in contrast with 1890, it may be fairly stated that
,even the literal application of a thoroughly established rule is not correct in
a case or situation in which that application does not make sense unless the
,court in honest conscience feels forced by its office to make the application.
C. Collateral to B, but deserving of separate statement, is the proposition
ithat the greater the felt need, because of felt sense, the %wider
is the leeway
,correctly and properly available in reshaping an authority or the authorities.
What is both proper and to be expected in an extreme case would become
;abuse and judicial usurpation if made daily practice in the mine-run of cases.
All courts worthy of their office feel this in their bones, as being inherent in
four system of precedent. They show the feeling in their work. Where differfences appear is where they should appear: in divergent sizings up of what is
sense, and of how great the need may be in any situation.
One last thing remains to be said about "sense."
There is a sense of the type of situation to be contrasted with the sense
,of a particular controversy between particular litigants. Which of these aspects of sense a court responds to more strongly makes a tremendous differ,ence. Response primarily to the sense of the particular controversy is, in the
first place, dangerous because a particular controversy may not be typical, and
'because it is hard to disentangle general sense from personalities and from
"fireside" equities. Such response is dangerous in the second place because it
leads readily to finding an out for this case only-and that leads to a complicating multiplicity of refinement and distinction, as also to repeated resort
to analogies unthought through and unfortunate of extension. This is what
the proverb seeks to say: "Hard cases make bad law."
If on the other hand the type of situation is in the forefront of attention,
a solving rule comes in for much more thoughtful testing and study. Rules are
thrust toward reasonable simplicity, and made with broader vision. Moreover,
the idiosyncracies of the particular case and its possible emotional deflections
are set for judgment against a broader picture which gives a fair chance that
accidental sympathy is not mistaken for long-range justice for all. And one
runs a better chance of skirting the incidence of the other proverb: "Bad law
makes hard cases."
On the case-law side, I repeat, we ought all thus to be familiar with

1950 ] REMARKS ON THEORY OF APPELLATE DECISION

399

the fact that the right doctrine and going practice of our highest courts leave
them a very real leeway within which (a) to narrow or avoid what seem
today to have been unfortunate prior phrasings or even rulings; or (b), on
the other hand, to pick up, develop, expand what seem today to have been
fortunate prior rulings or even phrasings.
It is silly, I repeat, to think of use of this leeway as involving "twisting"
of precedent. The very phrase presupposes the thing which is not and which
has never been. The phrase presupposes that there was in the precedent
under consideration some one and single meaning. The whole experience of
our case-law shows that that assumption is false. It is, instead, the business
of the courts to use the precedents constantly to make the law always a
little better, to correct old mistakes, to recorrect mistaken or ill-advised attempts at correction-but always within limits severely set not only by the
precedents, but equally by the traditions of right conduct in judicial office.
What we need to see now is that all of this is paralleled, in regard to
statutes, because of (1) the power of the legislature both to choose policy
and to select measures; and (2) the necessity that the legislature shall, in so
doing, use language-language fixed in particular words; and (3) the
continuing duty of the courts to make sense, under and within the law.
For just as prior courts can have been skillful or unskillful, clear or
unclear, wise or unwise, so can legislatures. And just as prior courts have
been looking at only a single piece of our whole law at a time, so have legislatures.
But a court must strive to make sense as a whole out of our law as a
whole. It must, to use Frank's figure, 2 take the music of any statute as written
by the legislature; it must take the text of the play as written by the legislature.
But there are many ways to play that music, to play that play, and a court's
duty is to play it well, and, in harmony with the other music of the legal system.
Hence, in the field of statutory construction also, there are "correct,"
unchallengeable rules of "how to read" which lead in happily variant directions.
This must be so until courts recognize that here, as in case-law, the real
guide is Sense-for-All-of-Us. It must be so, so long as we and the courts
pretend that there has been only one single correct answer possible. Until we
give up that foolish pretense there must be a set of mutually contradictory
correct rules on How to Construe Statutes: either set available as duty and
sense may require.
Until then, also, the problem will recur in statutory construction as in
the handling of case-law: Which of the technically correct answers (a) should
be given; (b) will be given-and Why?
And everything said above about the temper of the court, the temper
2. Frank, Words and Music: Some Remarks on Statutory Interpretation, 47 COL.
L. REv. 1259 (1947).
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of the court's tradition, the sense of the situation and the case, applies here as
well.
Thus in the period of the Grand Style of case-law statutes were construed "freely" to implement their purpose, the court commonly accepting the
legislature's choice of policy and setting to work to implement it. (Criminal
statutes and, to some extent, statutes on procedure, were exceptions.) Whereas in the Formal Period statutes tended to be limited or even eviscerated by
wooden and literal reading, in a sort of long-drawn battle between a balky,
stiff-necked, wrong-headed court and a legislature which had only words
with which to drive that court. Today the courts have regained, in the main,
a cheerful acceptance of legislative choice of policy, but they are still hampered
to some extent in carrying such policies forward by the Formal Period's
insistence on precise language.

One last thing is to be noted:
If a statute is to make sense, it must be read in the light of some assumed
purpose. A statute merely declaring a rule, with no purpose or objective, is
nonsense.
If a statute is to be merged into a going system of law, moreover, the
court must do the merging, and must in so doing take account of the policy of
the statute-or else substitute its own version of such policy. Creative reshaping of the net result is thus inevitable.
But the policy of a statute is of two wholly different kinds-each kind
somewhat limited in effect by the §tatute's choice of measures, and by the
statute's choice of fixed language. On the one hand there are the ideas consciously before the draftsmen, the committee, the legislature: a known evil to
be cured, a known goal to be attained, a deliberate choice of one line of
approach rather than another. Here talk of "intent" is reasonably realistic;
committee reports, legislative debate, historical knowledge of contemporary
thinking or campaigning which points up the evil or the goal can have
significance.
But on the other hand-and increasingly as a statute gains in age-its
language is called upon to deal with circumstances utterly uncontemplated
at the time of its passage. Here the quest is not properly for the sense originally
intended by the statute, for the sense sought originally to be put into it,
but rather for the sense which can be quarried out of it in the light of the
new situation. Broad purposes can indeed reach far beyond details known or
knowable at the time of drafting. A "dangerous weapon" statute of 1840 can
include tommy guns, tear gas or atomic bombs. "Vehicle," in a statute of 1840,
can properly be read, when sense so suggests, to include an automobile, or a
hydroplane that lacks wheels. But for all that, the sound quest does not
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run primarily in terms of historical intent. It runs in terms of what the words
can be made to bear, in making sense in the light of the unforeseen.
III
When it comes to presenting a proposed construction in court, there is
an accepted conventional vocabulary. As in argument over points of case-law,
the accepted convention still, unhappily requires discussion as if only one single correct meaning could exist. Hence there are two opposing canons on almost every point. An arranged selection is appended. Every lawyer must be
familiar with them all: they are still needed tools of argument. At least as early
as Fortescue the general picture was clear, on this, to any eye which would see.
Plainly, to make any canon take hold in a particular instance, the construction contended for must be sold, essentially, by means other than the
use of the canon: The good sense of the situation and a sinple construction
of the available language to achieve that sense, by tenable means, out of the
statutory language.
CANONS OF CONSTRUCTION

Statutory interpretation still speaks a diplomatic tongue. Here is some of the
technical framework for maneuver.
PARRY

BUT

THRUST

1. A statute cannot go beyond its
text.0

1. To effect its purpose a statute
may be implemented beyond its
text."

2. Statutes in derogation of the
common law will not be extended
by construction.'

2. Such acts will be liberally construed if their nature is remedial.'

3. Statutes are to be read in the
light of the common law and a
statute affirming a common lav rule
is to be construed in accordance
with the common law.7

3. The common law gives way to a
statute which is in consistent with
it and when a statute is designed as.
a revision of a whole body of law
applicable to a given subject it
supersedes the common law.'

3. First National Bank v. DeBerriz, 87 W. Va. 477, 105 S.E. 900 (1921) ; SUTHER(2d ed. 1904) ; 59 C.J., Statutes, § 575 (1932).
4. Dooley v. Penn. R.R., 250 Fed. 142 (D. Minn. 1918); 59 C.J., Statutes § 57S

LAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 388

(1932).

5. Devers v. City of Scranton, 308 Pa. 13, 161 Atl. 540 (1932) ; BLACK, CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF LAWS § 113 (2d ed. 1911); SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 573 (2d ed. 1904) ; 25 R.C.L., Statutes § 281 (1919).

6. Becker v. Brown, 65 Neb. 264, 91 N.W. 178 (1902) ;

INTERPRETATION OF LAWS

§ 113 (2d ed.

BLACK, CONSTRUCTION AND

1911) ; SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

88 573-75 (2d ed. 1904) ; 59 C.J., Statutes § 657 (1932).
7. Bandfield v. Bandfield, 117 Mich. 80, 75 N.W. 287 (1898); 25 R.C.L., Statutes
§ 280 (1919).
8. Hamilton v. Rathbone, 175 U.S. 414, 20 Sup. Ct. 155, 44 L. Ed. 219 (1899) ; State
v. Lewis, 142 N.C. 626, 55 S.E. 600 (1906) ; 25 R.C.L., Statutes §§ 280, 289 (1919).
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4. Where a foreign statute which
has received construction has been
adopted, previous construction is
adopted too.'

4. It may be rejected where there
is conflict with the obvious meaning of the statute or where the
foreign decisions are unsatisfactory
in reasoning or where the foreign
interpretation is not in harmony
with the spirit or policy of the laws
of the adopting state.1"

5. Where various states have already adopted the statute, the parent
state is followed."

5. Where interpretations of other
states are inharmonious, there is
no such restraint."

6. Statutes in pari inateria must
be construed together."

6. A statute is not in pari matcria
if its scope and aim are distinct or
where a legislative design to depart
from the general purpose or policy
of previous enactments may be apparent."4

7. A statute imposing a new penalty
or forfeiture, or a new liability or
disability, or creating a new right
of action will not be construed as
having a retroactive effect."

7. Remedial statutes are to be liberally construed and if a retroactive
interpretation will promote the ends
of justice, they should receive such
construction."

8. Where design has been distinctly stated no place is left for construction.

8. Courts have the power to inquire into real-as distinct from
ostensible-purpose.""

9. Freese v. Tripp, 70 Ill. 496 (1873) ;

BLACK, CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION

OF LAWS § 176 (2d ed. 1911) ; 59 C.J., Statutes, §§ 614, 627 (1932) ; 25 R.C.L., Statutes

§ 294 (1919).

10. Bowers v. Smith, 111 Mo. 45, 20 S.W. 101 (1892); BLACK, CONSTRUCTION AND
INxTRPRETAT oN OF LAWS § 176 (2d ed. 1911) ; SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCnON

§ 404 (2d ed. 1904) ; 59 C.J., Statutes § 628 (1932).

11. Burnside v. Wand, 170 Mo. 531, 71 S.W. 337 (1902).
12. State v. Campbell, 73 Kan. 688, 85 Pac. 784 (1906).
13. Milner v. Gibson, 249 Ky. 594, 61 S.W.2d 273 (1933); BLACK, CON STRUCTION
AND INTERPRETATION OF LAWS § 104 (2d ed. 1911) ; SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIoN §§ 443-48 (2d ed. 1904); 25 R.C.L., Statutes § 285 (1919).
14. Wheelock v. Myers, 64 Kan. 47, 67 Pac. 632 (1902); BLACK, CONSTRUCTION
AND INTERPRETATION OF LAWS § 104 (2d ed. 1911) ; SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 449 (2d ed. 1904) ; 59 CJ., Statutes § 620 (1932).
15. Keeley v. Great Northern Ry., 139 Wis. 448, 121 N.W. 167 (1909); BLACK,
CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF LAWS § 119 (2d ed. 1911).
16. Falls v. Key, 278 S.W. 893 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925); BLACK, CONSTRUCTION AND
INTERPRETATION OF LAWS § 120 (2d ed. 1911).
17. Federoff v. Birks Bros., 75 Cal. App. 345, 242 Pac. 885 (1925) ; SUTIERLAND,
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 358 (2d ed. 1904) ; 59 C.J., Statutes § 570 (1932).
18. Coulter v. Pool, 187 Cal. 181, 201 Pac. 120 (1921) ; 59 C.J., Statutes § 570 (1932).
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9. Definitions and rules of construction contained in an interpretation clause are part of the law
and binding."'

9. Definitions and rules of construction in a statute will not be
extended beyond their necessary
import nor allowed to defeat intention otherwise manifested."

10. A statutory provision requiring liberal construction does not
mean disregard of unequivocal requirements of the statute.2 '

10. Where a rule of construction is
provided within the statute itself
the rule should be applied.22

11. Titles do not control meaning;
preambles do not expand scope;

11. The title may be consulted as a
guide when there is doubt or obscurity in the body; preambles may
be consulted to determine rationale,
and thus the true construction of
terms; section headings may be
looked upon as part of the statute
2
itself. '

section

headings

do

not

change

language. -0

12. If language is plain and unambiguous it must be given effect.29

12. Not when literal interpretation
would lead to absurd or mischievous
consequences or thwart manifest
2

purpose. '

13. Words and phrases which have
received judicial construction before enactment are to be understood
according to that construction.

13. Not if the statute clearly requires them to have a different
meaning."9

19. Smith v. State, 28 Ind. 321 (1867) ; BLACK, CONSTRUCTION
§ 89 (2d ed. 1911) ; 59 C.J., Statutes § 567 (1932).

AND INTERPRETATION

OF LAWS

20. h; re Bissell, 245 App. Div. 395, 282 N.Y. Supp. 983 (4th Dep't 1935) ;
CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF LAWS

566 (1932).
21. Los Angeles County v. Payne, 82 Cal. App. 210, 255 Pac. 281 (1927);
LAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

SUTHER-

§ 360 (2d ed. 1904) ; 59 C.J., Statutes § 567 (1932).

22. State ex rel. Triay v. Burr, 79 Fla. 290, 84 So. 61 (1920);
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

BLACK,

§ 89 (2d ed. 1911); 59 C.J., Statutes §

SUTHERLAND,

§ 360 (2d ed. 1904) ; 59 C.J.,,Statutes § 567 (1932).

23. Westbrook v. McDonald, 184 Ark. 740, 44 S.W. 2d 331 (1931) ; Huntworth v-

Tanner, 87 Wash. 670, 152 Pac. 523 (1915) ; BLACK, CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION
OF LAWS §§ 83-85 (2d ed. 1911); SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §§ 339-42Z
(2d ed. 1904) ; 59 C.J., Statutes § 599 (1932) ; 25 R.C.L., Statutes §§ 266-267 (1919).
24. Brown v. Robinson, 275 Mass. 55, 175 N.E. 269 (1931) ; Gulley v. Jackson, 165.

Miss. 103, 145 So. 905 (1933); BLACK, CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF LAWS;
§§ 83-85 (2d ed. 1911); SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §§ 339-42 (2d ed.
1904) ; 59 C.J., Statutes §§ 598-99 (1932) ; 25 R.C.L., Statutes §§ 266, 267 (1919).
25. Newhall v. Sanger, 92 U.S. 761, 23 L. Ed. 769 (1875) ; BLACK, CONSTRUCTION ANDINTERPRETATION OF LAWS § 51 (2d ed. 1911); 59 C.J., Statutes § 569 (1932) ; 25 R.C.L.,
Statutes §§ 213, 225 (1919).
26. Clark v. Murray, 141 Kan. 533, 41 P.2d 1042 (1935) ; SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 363 (2d ed. 1904) ; 59 C.J., Statutes § 573 (1932) ; 25 R.C.L., Statutes,
§§ 214, 257 (1919).
27. Scholze v. Sholze, 2 Tenn. App. 80 (M.S. 1925); BLACK, CONSTRUCTION ANDINTERPRETATION OF LAWS § 65 (2d ed. 1911) ; SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
§ 363 (2d ed. 1904).
28. Dixon v. Robbins, 246 N.Y. 169, 158 N.E. 63 (1927); BLACK, CONSTRUCTIONAND INTERPRETATION OF LAWS § 65 (2d ed. 1911); SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 363 (2d ed. 1904).
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14. After enactment, judicial decision upon interpretation of particular terms and phrases controls."

14. Practical construction by executive officers is strong evidence of
true meaning."

15. Words are to be taken in their
ordinary meaning unless they are
technical terms or words of art. 1

15. Popular words may bear a technical meaning and technical words
may have a popular signification
and they should be so construed.
as to agree with evident intention
or to make the statute operative."

16. Every word and clause must be
given effect."

16. If inadvertantly inserted or if
repugnant to the rest of the statute,
they may be rejected as surplusage."

17. The same language used repeatedly in the same connection is
presumed to bear the same meaning
throughout the statute."

17. This presumption will be disregarded where it is necessary to
assign different meanings to make
the statute consistent."0

18. Words are to be interpreted
according to the proper grammatical
effect of their arrangement within
the statute."

18. Rules of grammar will be disregarded where strict adherence
would defeat purpose."

19. Exceptions not made cannot be
read."

19. The letter is only the "bark."
Whatever is within the reason of the
law is within the law itself."'

29. Eau Claire National Bank v. Benson, 106 Wis. 624, 82 N.W. 604 (1900); BLACK,
93 (2d ed. 1911).
30. State ex rel. Bashford v. Frear, 138 Wis. 536, 120 N.W. 216 (1909); BLACK,
CoNsTRUcrIO
AND INTERPRETATION OF LAWS § 94 (2d ed. 1911); 25 R.C.L., Statutes
§ 274 (1919).
31. Hawley Coal Co. v. Bruce, 252 Ky. 455, 67 S.W.2d 703 (1934); BLACK, CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPETATION OF LAWS § 63 (2d ed. 1911) ; SUTEMRLAND, STATUTORY
CONsTRUcTION, §§ 390, 393 (2d ed. 1904) ; 59 C.J., Statutes, §§ 577, 578 (1932).
32. Robinson v. Varnell, 16 Tex. 382 (1856) ; BLACK, CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF LAWS § 63 (2d ed. 1911); SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONsTRUCTION § 395
(2d ed. 1904); 59 C.J., Statutes §§ 577, 578 (1932).
33. In re Terry's Estate, 218 N.Y. 218, 112 N.E. 931 (1916); BLACK, CONSTRUCTION
AND INTER
TATION OF LAWS § 60 (2d ed. 1911); SUTIIERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 380 (2d ed. 1904).
34. United States v. York, 131 Fed. 323 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1904); BLACK, CONS'nTCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF LAWS § 60 (2d ed. 1911); SUTIERLAND, STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION §§ 384 (2d ed. 1904).
35. Spring Canyon Coal Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 74 Utah 103, 277 Pac. 206 (1929);
BLACK, CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF LAWS § 53 (2d ed. 1911).
36. State v. Knowles, 90 Md. 646, 45 AtI. 877 (1900); BLACK, CONSTRUCTION AND
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20. Expression of one thing excludes another.'

20. The language may fairly comprehend many different cases where
some only are expressly mentioned
by way of example.'

21. General terms are to receive a
general construction."'

21. They may be limited by specific
terms with which they are associated
or by the scope and purpose of the
statute."

22. It is a general rule of construction that where general words
follow an enumeration they are to
be held as applying only to persons
and things of the same general kind
or class specifically mentioned
(ejusdem generis)."

22. General words must operate on
something. Further, ejusdem generis
is only an aid in getting the meaning and does not warrant confining
the operations of a statute within
narrower limits than were intended.'6

23. Qualifying or limiting words
or clauses are to be referred to the
next preceding antecedent. "

23. Not when evident sense and
meaning require a different construction."'

24. Punctuation will govern when a
statute is open to two construc-

24. Punctuation marks will not control the plain and evident meaning
of language." °
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25. It must be assumed that language hag been chosen with due regard to grammatical propriety and
is not interchangeable on mere conjecture&

25. "And" and "or" may be read
interchangeably
whenever
the
change is necessary to give the
statute sense and effect."'

26. There is a distinction between
words of permission and mandatory
words."

26. Words imparting permission
may be read as mandatory and
words imparting command may be
read as permissive when such construction is made necessary by evident intention or by the rights of
the public."'

27. A proviso qualifies the provision immediately preceding."

27. It may clearly be intended to
have a wider scope."

28. When the enacting clause is
general, a proviso is construed
strictly.Y

28. Not when it is necessary to extend the proviso to persons or cases
which come within its equity."
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